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ABSTRACT 
 
Decentralization can complement market liberalization by strengthening incentives of agents 
to exploit local information in response to market signals.  In China, however, banks 
centralized lending authority following financial reforms in the mid-1990s.  We offer a new 
theory of financial decentralization in which centralization provides a credible commitment 
not to refinance bad projects by reducing available information.  Using data from Chinese 
rural financial institutions, we empirically assess the determinants of decentralization and the 
likelihood of collateral seizure, strongly confirming the predictions of the refinancing model.  
We conclude that the inability of financial systems to exploit local information in weak 
institutional environments may limit the efficiency of financial intermediation despite 
financial market liberalization.   
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A Refinancing Model of Decentralization with Empirical Evidence from China 
 
1.  Introduction 
In recent years, financial liberalization has been a main focus of reform in developing 
countries and more recently in transition economies (e.g., Haggard and Lee, 1995).  Financial 
liberalization transforms a heavily regulated system into a market-oriented one by reducing 
barriers to entry, reducing government influence over credit allocation, and increasing 
reliance on market-determined interest rates. Conventional wisdom holds that 
decentralization of control rights goes hand-in-hand with market liberalization.  With greater 
decision-making authority, local managers have greater incentives to exploit local 
information in response to market signals, which increases the efficiency of resource 
allocation.  Effective use of local information may be especially important when there are 
large information asymmetries between central and local managers.  In banking, this is likely 
to occur in weak institutional environments in which credit ratings, high quality appraisal and 
auditing services, standardized reporting systems, and well-developed legal systems are 
absent.   
Surprisingly, in China most banks responded to financial reforms in the mid-1990s 
by centralizing rather than decentralizing control rights.  This contrasts with the history of 
key reforms in China’s agricultural and industrial sectors that decentralized decision-making 
authority to households and firm managers as the role of markets increased (Naughton, 
1995).  But it is consistent with evidence from developing and transition economies that 
financial liberalization and decentralization may have unintended effects if underlying 
institutional factors are left unaddressed (Cho, 1986; Buch, 1996; Koford and Tschoegl, 
1997; Schmidt, 1998).
1   
This paper provides a new theory of financial decentralization that explains why 
decentralization may not always be desirable, especially in developing and transition 
economies.  The model’s key insight is that by improving local information, decentralization 
can reduce the ability of lenders to credibly commit not to refinance bad projects, the effect 
                                                 
1 Cho (1986) shows that poorly developed capital markets and the preponderance of bank loans in corporate 
financing may have prevented financial liberalization from having its intended effects.  Based on the 
experiences of Eastern European countries, Buch (1996) argues that successful domestic financial liberation 
and banking reform requires the creation of a market-based incentive system and a new institutional framework 
(e.g., mechanisms of corporate control for both banks and enterprises) to facilitate banks hardening the budget 
constraints of enterprises and coping with the asymmetric information problem in financial markets. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 461 
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of which is to soften the budget constraint of borrowers.  In the context of a corporation, 
Cremer (1995) shows that more information may hurt the principal’s ability to refuse 
renegotiation.  Berglof and Roland (1998) find that when liquidation costs are sufficiently 
high, lenders may lack the credibility to liquidate financially distressed projects, leading to 
soft budget constraints.  In this paper, we present a model in which centralization can 
provide a credible commitment not to refinance bad projects, which improves project 
performance and loan repayment by increasing the effort incentives of firm managers.  In 
China, financial centralization increased as concerns about refinancing grew in the mid-1990s 
when the economy slowed and increasing numbers of firms encountered financially 
difficulties. 
Our argument uses the key insight from Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) to come to 
an exactly opposite conclusion.  They argue that decentralization in the form of a division of 
large banks into small ones can serve as a commitment device that helps lenders harden the 
budget constraint of borrowers.  This is because, unlike large banks, small banks are 
incapable of refinancing ongoing projects independently.  However, other potential lenders 
may be unwilling to refinance projects when they have poor information about firm quality.  
Entrepreneurs with questionable projects will anticipate that refinancing is less likely and will 
not seek financing in the first place, or will exert greater effort to make projects successful.  
In both our model and that of Dewatripont and Maskin, credible commitment not to 
refinance is achieved by taking lending authority out of the hands of bank managers who 
have better information.  However, in our case this is accomplished by centralizing lending 
authority rather than dividing large banks into small banks, which Dewatripont and Maskin 
describe as “decentralization.” 
The refinancing problem is likely to be particularly important in transition economies 
because poorly developed institutions make liquidation of collateral costly, so that borrowers 
are more likely to anticipate refinancing loans if projects go bad.  In China, “fishing” projects 
are very common in which outstanding debt serves as bait for attracting additional loans 
because banks cannot get the old loans back unless they are willing to make more new loans 
(Li and Li, 1996).  This dynamic may help explain the growth in debt-asset ratios in both 
state-owned enterprises and rural collective enterprises in the 1990s (Lardy, 1998; Park and 
Shen, 2001).  Lack of accounting standards often observed in transition economies may 
exacerbate the problem (Buch, 1996).  For example, if banks are able to roll over loans to William Davidson Institute Working Paper 461 
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hide repayment problems, then liquidation of projects may lead directly to large accounting 
losses which may be viewed as unacceptable to bank managers.  This makes refinancing 
more attractive, undermining the credibility of threats to liquidate projects once defaults 
occur. 
In this paper, we use bank-level data on managerial decision-making authority in a 
large transition economy to test whether theory can explain observed heterogeneity in 
decentralization of lending authority in financial institutions.  The unique data set was 
collected in surveys of rural financial institutions, enterprises, and local government officials 
conducted by the authors in 1998 in southern China.  Surprisingly, we found no existing 
empirical research on the validity of different theories explaining financial decentralization.  
The question is important for validating the assumptions of existing theory, and practically 
for assessing the efficiency of financial resource allocation.   
The ongoing financial transition in China offers an excellent setting for empirical 
study of financial decentralization.  China is an interesting case because banks recently 
became commercialized but supporting institutions are not fully developed, leading to rich 
variation across space in the extent of decentralization.  Financial reform in China aims at 
transforming financial institutions from government-run banks to independent financial 
intermediaries (Qian, 1994; and Lardy, 1998).  Important aspects of China’s financial reform 
in the mid-1990s were the introduction of bank competition among state-owned banks, the 
strengthening of profit incentives for managers, and the transfer of policy loans to newly 
established policy banks (Park and Sehrt, 2001).  Individual banks have been allowed to 
decide for themselves whether or not to decentralize lending authority to local bank 
managers.   
In China and elsewhere, agency problems provide an alternative explanation for 
centralized decision-making.  Local bank managers may collude with or be influenced by 
local government leaders, who, as social planners of local communities, internalize not only 
the economic benefits of running firms but also non-economic ones such as enterprise and 
employment creation, and potential tax extraction (Svejnar, 1990; Jin and Qian, 1998).
2  
Policy lending and soft budget constraints are a notorious problem plaguing financial 
institutions in transition economies (Kornai, 1986).  However, we study decision-making in 
                                                 
2 They may also take payoffs from firms, which can hurt loan performance if the manager values such payoffs 
more than profits to the bank. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 461 
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banks at the lowest administrative level in China, the township, where such problems are 
considered to be less serious (Qian and Roland, 1998).  In China, financial reforms 
strengthened managerial profit incentives, and our survey found that policy influence on 
lending fell substantially during the mid-1990s.  The timing of centralization thus is not 
consistent with the expected reduction in moral hazard problems over time (Park and Shen, 
forthcoming).
3 
The problem we focus upon in this paper is the allocation of lending authority 
between upper level management, the center, and lower level management, the local.  In 
section 2, we present two models, a costly information model and a refinancing model, to 
illustrate how different factors affect optimal decentralization in a two-tier hierarchy.  This 
yields a set of theoretical predictions on the effect of key parameters on the decentralization 
decision.  Section 3 presents the evidence from China.  We first introduce the data, then 
describe financial decentralization and commercialization in China’s rural financial sector, 
discuss the estimation strategy, and present the results of our empirical analysis of the 
determinants of decentralization and the propensity for bank managers to seize collateral.  
Section 4 concludes. 
Our main findings are that the desire to credibly commit against refinancing 
theoretically can explain centralization, and that this explanation is strongly supported by the 
Chinese data.  We conclude that in imperfect institutional environments, centralization can 
help resolve agency and commitment problems, although likely at substantial cost in terms 
of lost information and reduced incentives of local managers.  This outcome suggests that 
rapid commercialization of banking systems in transition economies will not automatically 
lead to substantial improvement in financial intermediation unless deeper institutional 
reforms occur as well. 
 
2.  Theory 
We present two complementary models of decentralization.  The first, which we call 
the costly information model, is a one-period model that illustrates how the decision to 
decentralize is affected by the benefits and costs of using local information.  Simple 
extensions examine how collateral, financial competition, and agency problems (i.e., local 
                                                 
3 Centralization might also enable banks to better diversify their portfolios regionally, but interviews found this 
motivation not be important empirically. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 461 
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government influence over lending) affect optimal decentralization.   We then present a 
model with multiple periods to examine how the refinancing problem alters key predictions 
about the model parameters.  Both models assume that central managers are profit 
maximizers.   
 
2.1.  The Costly Information Model 
  We consider a local economy with N firms whose types are uniformly distributed.  A 
firm’s type  [ ] q q ˛ 0 1 ,  is the probability of project success, where q0 is the least profitable 
firm type in the economy.  We assume that all firms demand loans and that firms are only 
able to repay loans when their projects are successful.  Therefore, q is also the expected rate 
of repayment.  For simplicity, we assume that all firms require one dollar of investment to 
operate.  
   Each bank has two levels, the center and the local branch, or local.  The center 
controls all of the resources of the bank and decides whether to delegate control rights over 
lending to the local bank manager.  Following Aghion and Tirole (1997) and Strausz (1997), 
the center and local managers are endowed with different technologies in gathering 
information about firm types.  With a fixed cost of m, the local bank manager can perfectly 
identify q for each firm in the local economy.
4  The central manager, who does not have 
access to the local information technology, knows only the distribution of firm types, which 
is common knowledge.  Information about firm type is valuable because not all firms are 
profitable to finance, i.e.,  0 0 < - I L R R q , where R r I I = + 1  and R r L L = + 1 .  Here, rI  and 
rLare the market intermediation rate, or cost of funds, and the lending interest rate, 
respectively.  Interest rates are assumed to be exogenous to both central and local bank 
managers, an assumption we defend below.   
Without loss of generality, we assume that both central and local managers are risk 
neutral.  Assuming he is willing to invest m for project screening, a local bank manager who 
is maximizing profits will lend to all firms for which  I L R R ‡ q .  This acts as an incentive 
compatibility constraint for the center.  The threshold borrowing type below which no 
lending occurs is  
                                                 
4 The assumption that screening exhibits scale economies appears often in the literature, e.g., Berglof and 
Roland (1998).    William Davidson Institute Working Paper 461 
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is the optimal number of firms financed by local bank managers, where N is the total 
number of potential borrowers in the local economy.  W is the transfer from the local to the 
center, which we assume is a lump sum.  It is easy to show that a profit-sharing contract is 
non-distorting and equivalent to a lump sum payment.  Contracts that do distort incentives, 
such as revenue-sharing contracts, are dominated by lump sum transfers which can achieve 
full efficiency and full rent extraction.
5  To simplify, we also assume the local bank manager 
has zero reservation utility.  
  If the center does not decentralize lending authority, she will lend to all firms that 
apply for loans as long as the expected profit of lending is positive, or  0
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otherwise, no firms will be financed.  The central manager is willing to decentralize control 
rights over lending if the benefits from delegation exceed the expected profits from 
centralized lending, or 
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The center sets W to maximize the extraction of surplus from the local bank manager. 
  From (1), (2) and (3), it follows that the center will decentralize control over lending 
if and only if 
(4)  ( ) 0 ) 1 ( 2 0
2
0 ‡ - - - L L I mR R R N q q . 
Deriving comparative statics from (4) is straightforward and yields the following proposition. 
 
                                                 
5 This presumes the absence of agency problems, in which case performance-linked contracts may be preferred. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 461 
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PROPOSITION 1.  In the costly information model with fixed information costs,
 the 
center is more likely to decentralize control over lending if the information cost (m) and 
lending interest rate ( L R ) are lower and if the cost of funds ( I R ) and number of firms (N) 
are higher.  The effect of the overall quality of firms ( 0 q ) is ambiguous.
 6 
Proof.  Immediately follows from the derivatives of (4).  
 
Proposition 1 states that the center may decentralize lending authority to take 
advantage of the local bank manager’s costly access to better information.  The gain from 
decentralization can be enlarged if local bank managers gather information on borrowers 
more effectively, i.e., more cheaply.  A higher lending interest rate leads banks to lend to 
lower quality firm types under decentralization, reducing the expected increase in repayment 
rates from decentralization.  Also, since there is more lending in centralized systems (all 
firms get loans), a higher interest rate increases the absolute profit level under centralization 
than under decentralization.  For these two reasons, a higher lending interest rate reduces the 
likelihood of decentralization.  By a similar logic, the cost of funds has the opposite effects 
of the lending interest rate.  When we assume scale economies in information gathering, a 
greater number of potential borrowing firms (N) can lower the per-loan cost of information.  
Finally, higher firm quality (higher  0 q ) has an ambiguous effect on decentralization.  A 
higher  0 q  raises total profitability under both decentralization and centralization but reduces 
the benefits of better screening under decentralization since a greater share of all firms are 
financed.  In an extreme case, when  0 q  reaches a level where all firms applying for loans are 
financed by the local bank manager, the center may in fact suffer a loss of the amount m if 
she decentralizes lending authority.   
We next extend the model to examine the roles of collateral, financial competition, 
and government influence over lending. 
                                                 
6 If m is a variable cost, we can rewrite equation (4) as ( ) 0 ) ( 2
2
0 ‡ - - - I L L I R R m R R q .   This leads to 
two changes: the number of firms (N) has no impact on decentralization; and firm type ( 0 q ) has a negative 
effect on decentralization. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 461 
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Collateral.  The use of collateral increases the payoff to the lender when a project fails.  
With collateral V, we can rewrite equations (2) and (3) as follows. 
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V R
L
I
V -
-
= q .  Accordingly, we derive a new version of equation (4), 
(4a)  ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) 0 ) 1 ( 2 0
2
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Comparing (4a) to (4) reveals that collateral acts like an equal shift in both the lending 
interest rate and the cost of funds.  Effective collateral lowers the effective cost of funds and 
increases the expected return to lending--price effects.  However, because  P V q £ q , the use 
of collateral increases the amount of projects to be financed by both the center and local, 
which reduces the expected benefits of better screening--a portfolio effect.  Overall, the 
impact of collateral on optimal decentralization is ambiguous. 
Bank Competition.  The introduction of bank competition may affect both the number 
of potential borrowers and the distribution of firm types available to the local branch.  We 
define  P N  as the optimal number of firms that are financed by the local bank manager, 
where  ￿ ￿
ł
￿
￿ ￿
Ł
￿
-
-
=
0 1
1
q
q P
P N N .  If we assume that competitors are endowed with identical 
screening technology, the distribution of firm types available to each bank is the same.  
However, competition will reduce N, the total number of potential borrowing firms available 
to each bank.  This raises the information cost per loan, making centralization of lending 
authority more likely.  If screening technologies of competitors differ, competition may also 
affect the distribution of firm types in the pool of potential borrowers.  The result on 
competition also disappears if information costs are assumed to be variable rather than fixed. 
  Government Influence.  Extending the costly information model, we assume that local 
government leaders can impose a lump sum fine, G, should their demand for new loans for 
any firms in their jurisdiction be unsatisfied.  To avoid the penalty, local bank managers will 
finance projects for which  0 ‡ + - G R R I Lq .  The threshold firm type receiving loans with William Davidson Institute Working Paper 461 
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government involvement is then  G q , where  P L I G R G R q q £ - = / ) ( .  The difference 
G P q q -  represents the degree of influence of government officials on lending decisions.  
Re-deriving the local bank manager’s participation constraint and substituting into (3) gives 
us the following condition for decentralization: 
 
(4b)  ( ) ( ) 0 ) 1 ( 2 2 0 0
2 2
0 ‡ - - - - - m R N R N I G L G q q q q q . 
 
By examining the derivative of (4b), it is straightforward to show that the more aggressive 
the local government (high G or, equivalently, low  G q ), the less likely decentralization will 
occur.  However, there could be scope for designing incentive contracts to address the 
agency problem without centralizing decision-making, but that takes us beyond the scope of 
this paper.     
 
2.2.  The Refinancing Model 
  To examine the refinancing decision, we extend the costly information model to 
multiple periods and exclude parameters, such as the cost of information, whose effects do 
not differ from the costly information model.  As noted earlier, our model shares an essential 
feature of that of Dewatripont and Maskin (1995); it argues that the lack of information can 
allow the lender to credibly commit not to refinance.  However, our definition of 
decentralization is different.  We are interested in whether the center decentralizes control 
rights to allow local branch managers to approve loans, or reserves such approval rights for 
herself.  We show that, by centralizing loan refinancing decisions, the center can credibly 
commit to having poorer information and to not refinance projects, leading in some 
circumstances to greater effort by borrowers to make projects successful. 
The game between creditor and borrower has three stages.  First, the bank decides 
whether or not to make a new one-dollar loan to the borrower.  With some probability q1, 
the project is successful, yielding return  1 Y , enough to repay the loan principle and interest, 
L R  (where  L L r R + =1 ), and a private benefit  1 B to the borrower, which is non-transferable.
7  
If the project is unsuccessful, following Berglof and Roland (1998) in the second stage the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 461 
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borrower can exert effort e (from zero to one) to improve the likelihood that the project can 
yield enough to cover its costs and repay the loan.  With probability e, the project does so, 
the loan is repaid, and the borrower’s payoff is  1 B -w(e), where w(e) is the cost of effort.  With 
probability 1-e, the project fails and the game moves to a third stage in which the bank 
decides whether to liquidate the project to obtain collateral value V with certainty or to 
make a second one-dollar refinancing loan at interest rate rL.  We assume  V rL > , that it is 
more profitable to successfully refinance than to liquidate.
8  Finally, if the loan is refinanced, 
the project is successful with probability q2, in which case the project produces return  2 Y , 
the loan is repaid, and the borrower earns  2 2 B R Y L + - .  If the project is unsuccessful, both 
the borrower and bank get nothing.  With successful projects, banks could also collect part 
or all of their initial loan.  The decision nodes of the game are summarized in Figure 1. 
  The key to the model is its information assumptions.  Following the setup of the 
costly information model, we assume that q1 and q2 are draws from a uniform distribution 
[ ] 1 , 0 q  and  1 Y  and  2 Y  are positive constants greater than 1+rL.  The center has no 
information on firm types but local managers know each firm’s q1 and q2.  We make the 
simplifying assumption that q1 and q2 are independent, which implies that failure in the first 
period is not correlated with failure if the loan is refinanced.  This greatly simplifies the 
analysis of lending decisions and expected payoffs in the refinancing stage but does not alter 
the qualitative nature of the key predictions.  If q1 and q2 were correlated, or even identical, 
an uninformed lender, i.e., the center, would update her beliefs about the distribution of q2 
when making the refinancing decision.  In general the pool would be worse than the initial 
borrowing pool.  But as long as there remain gains to information, all the main results go 
through.  
  We start from the end of the game and work backwards to study the decentralization 
decision.  With perfect information, the bank refinances only projects for which 
V RL > -1 2 q .  For now, we assume there is no cost of funds.  Otherwise, the bank 
liquidates the project, earning V.  With no information, the bank refinances all projects if 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 B1 can be interpreted in different ways.  For example, Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) define it as the 
opportunity cost for the firm manager to manage projects diligently. 
8 Collateral need not be so low for refinancing to be viable, since payoffs to refinancing also could include 
claims on collateral in the event of non-payment or the possibility of recovering earlier loans. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 461 
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and only if the expected return is greater than the collateral value, i.e.,  V RL > - ￿
ł
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Otherwise, it refuses to refinance all projects.  It is this refusal that under certain conditions 
can serve as a credible commitment not to refinance. 
  When facing the decision of whether to refinance, the bank is guaranteed an 
expected return of V since it can always decide to liquidate all projects.  At this point in the 
game, we treat the original $1 loan as sunk.  The expected profit from refinancing depends 
on whether the bank is decentralized (d) is the following: 
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Here, 
* q is the threshold firm type above which the local manager agrees to refinance.  The 
expected profit when lending is centralized (c) is the following: 
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The return is V if the expected profit is sufficiently low that the lender liquidates all loans, 
and is equal to the average return to lending to all types when the center refinances all loans.  
Comparing (5) and (6), it is easy to see that at the game’s third stage, the bank’s expected 
profit is unambiguously higher when lending is informed. 
  Knowing these decision rules for liquidation and refinancing, we study the effort 
decision of the borrower.  In particular, we are interested in seeing whether there are any 
conditions under which informed and uninformed lending lead to different effort levels.  In 
the informed case, the borrower’s effort depends on whether he or she anticipates a 
successful project and refinancing, since the borrower earns positive returns with refinancing 
but gets nothing from a sure loser that is liquidated: 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 461 
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When lending is uninformed, either all loans are refinanced or no loans are refinanced, 
depending on whether the expected return from lending is greater than the liquidation value.  
If uninformed lenders refinance loans, then the borrower’s maximization problem is 
identical to the first equation in (7) regardless of the borrower’s type, q2.  However, when the 
lender does not refinance any loans because  V RL < - ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ +
1
2
1 0 q
, the borrower’s effort is 
defined by the second equation in (7), again regardless of the borrower’s type.  We focus on 
the no refinancing case, for which effort will be higher for some firms when the lender is 
uninformed.
9  The borrower, instead of reducing effort in anticipation of a possible payoff 
when the project is refinanced, instead exerts maximum effort because he knows the bank 
will definitely not refinance.  In this way, the bank can improve its loan repayment rate by 
centralizing refinancing loan approval rights.  We denote effort in the decentralized 
(informed) and centralized (uninformed) cases as ed and ec.  From the above, we have shown 
that  d c e e ‡ . 
  Treating the one dollar loan as a sunk cost, the expected immediate profit at the time 
of making the original loan is  i L E R 2 1 1 ) 1 ( p q q - + .  If the project is unsuccessful, the 
expected profit ( i E 2 p ) is the following: 
 
(8)      ) , ( ) 1 ( 3 2 i i L i i E V Max e R e E p p - + =  
 
With probability  i e , the original loan will be paid in full, and with probability ( i e - 1 ) the 
borrower will default on the original loan, leaving the lender with either the liquidation value 
or the expected profit from refinancing the loan ( i E 3 p ).  The i subscript denotes the fact 
                                                 
9 In the former case, centralized lenders always choose to refinance because lending is profitable on average 
even when the center refinances indiscriminately.  In this case, centralization softens the budget constraint, but 
we consider this outcome unlikely in transition economies in which many projects are risky. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 461 
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that both borrower effort and the expected return from refinancing depend upon whether 
the refinancing decision is centralized or decentralized (i=c or d).  As noted above, the only 
situation in which centralization makes sense is when the center can credibly commit not to 
refinance, or  V RL < - ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ +
1
2
1 0 q
 and when doing so increases borrower effort, or  
V RL ‡ -1 2 q .  In this circumstance, we can write the difference in the expected profits of 
lending to a firm with type  2 q  under decentralization versus centralization as follows: 
 
(9)  V e R e R e R e E E c L c L d L d c d ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( 2 2 2 - - - - - + = - q p p  
 
Here,  c d e e £ , and from (7) we know that  ) , , , ( 2 1 2 B B R e e L d d q = , and  ) ( 1 B e e c c = .  
Decentralization reduces borrower effort and the likelihood of repayment of the original 
loan but increases the expected return in the event the loan is not repaid, leading to an 
ambiguous sign for (9).   
 
PROPOSITION 2.  In the refinancing model, the effect of a higher lending interest rate 
( L R ) on decentralization is ambiguous, and decentralization is more likely lower cost of 
funds ( I R ), lower liquidation value (V), and higher expected firm performance ( 0 q ). 
Proof.  From (9), we derive the comparative statics:
10 
(10)  ) ( ) 1 ( )) 1 ( (
) (
2 2
2 2
c d d L L
L
d
L
c d e e e R R
R
e
R
E E
- + - + - -
¶
¶
=
¶
- ¶
q q
p p
 
From (7), we know that  0 >
¶
¶
L
d
R
e
, so the first term is positive.  The second term is also 
positive, but the third term is negative, since  c d e e £ .  In addition to the positive incentive 
effect on firm managerial effort, a higher lending interest rate increases profits for the bank 
under decentralization whether or not the project is initially successful, because profits also 
increase for refinanced loans.  Under centralization, profits increase only if the project is 
successful.  However, this increase theoretically can outweigh all of the positive profit effects William Davidson Institute Working Paper 461 
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under decentralization if the effort difference (and likelihood of initial project success) under 
centralization versus decentralization is great enough.   
(11)    0
) ( 2 2 <
¶
- ¶
I
c d
R
E E p p
 
In (9), above, we can replace the second term by the expression  ) )( 1 ( 2 I L d R R e - - q . 
(12)  0
) ( 2 2 <
¶
- ¶
V
E E c d p p
 
This result also obtains directly from (9) above. 
(13)  0
) (
0
2 2 >
¶
- ¶
q
p p c d E E
 
The condition for centralization to be a viable option is  V RL < - ￿
ł
￿
￿
Ł
￿ +
1
2
1 0 q
.  Thus, the 
higher is  0 q , the less likely that credible commitment to liquidate projects is credible, which 
reduces the likelihood of decentralization. 
 
  The intuition that the liquidation value has a negative effect on decentralization is 
clearer if we think of liquidation value as a type of collateral.  As Holmstrom and Tirole 
(1997) have demonstrated, collateral is a substitute for bank monitoring.  The use of 
effective collateral undermines the importance of local information and thus enables the 
central manager to centralize control rights over lending.  Finally, we note that the 
refinancing model makes no predictions on whether the decision to make initial loans is 
centralized or not.  In fact, by the assumptions of the model, there would be no reason to 
centralize initial lending. 
 
2.3.  Summary of Model Predictions 
Table 1 summarized the predictions of the two models for how different parameters 
affect the decentralization decision.  Comparative statics for four parameters are derived 
only from the costly information model.  Assuming there are fixed information costs, 
lending authority is more likely to be decentralized if local bank managers have advantages in 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 V and RL will also affect the range of  2 q for which borrower effort increases under decentralization, or for 
which equation (9) is meaningful.  But these effects do not alter the comparative statics results derived directly William Davidson Institute Working Paper 461 
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gathering information (smaller m), the pool of borrowers is larger (larger N), there is less 
bank competition (smaller c), and government influence on lending is less (smaller G).   If 
information costs are variable only, N and c should have no effects.  Predictions for the 
other four model parameters are not consistent in the costly information model and the 
refinancing model. The impact of lending interest rates (RL) is negative in the costly 
information model but ambiguous in the refinancing model, and the effect of the cost of 
funds (RI) is positive in the costly information model but negative in the refinancing model.   
Firm quality (q0) has an uncertain effect in the costly information model assuming fixed 
information costs, and a positive effect in the refinancing model.  If information costs are 
variable, the effect of firm quality in the costly information model is negative.  Collateral 
value (V) has an ambiguous effect on decentralization in the costly information model but a 
negative effect in the refinancing model. Differences in the predictions of the two models 
yield testable hypotheses for distinguishing which model has greater empirical explanatory 
power. 
 
3.  Evidence from China 
3.1.  Data 
The data used in this paper were collected from field surveys conducted by the 
authors in Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces during the summer of 1998.  Most of the 
information was garnered from face-to-face interviews with bank managers, firm managers 
and government leaders at the county and township levels.  Select historical data were copied 
from accounting books.  Most of the questions are for the years 1994 and 1997, respectively.  
These years were chosen to facilitate the study of changes in bank behavior following 
fundamental reforms introduced in 1994 that increased bank competition and promoted the 
commercialization of financial institutions.  Our survey focuses on the township level, the 
lowest government administrative level in China where branches of the Agricultural Bank of 
China (ABC) and rural credit cooperatives (RCCs) reside.  The ABC is one of China’s four 
specialized banks, with the largest branch network among specialized banks, extending to 
most but not all townships.  The RCCs are cooperatives in name only, not in governance.  
Originally under the supervision of the ABC, since 1996 they have been under the People’s 
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Bank of China.  RCCs are the only financial institutions with branch outlets extending to 
nearly all townships as well as many villages.  ABC branches and RCCs have been the 
primary lenders to township and village enterprises (TVEs), the most dynamic sector of 
China’s economy since reforms were launched in 1978 (Oi, 1999).  According to the survey 
data, 78 percent of bank loans within the township were granted by ABC branches and 
RCCs. 
The survey covers 15 counties in the two coastal provinces.  Zhejiang and Jiangsu 
have experienced rapid economic growth in the last two decades, but still contain both well-
developed and lagging regions.  All of the counties were randomly sampled after 
stratification by region and industrial output per capita.  Four townships were randomly 
selected in each county after stratifying townships by industrial output per capita in 1997.  
Sixty townships thus were selected in the 15 counties, and government leaders and managers 
from 59 townships, 57 ABC local branches and 58 RCCs were interviewed.  In each county, 
ABC county branch and RCC county association, the parent institutions of ABC local 
branches and RCCs, were also surveyed.  This paper looks at the allocation of lending 
authority between county and township branches.  A unique feature of the survey is that we 
collected not only bank data but also matched data from borrowers and local government 
leaders where the financial institutions were located.   
 
3.2.  Financial Decentralization in China 
  One of the goals of financial reform in China was to give financial institutions more 
autonomy in decision-making and free them from excessive interference by government 
officials.  During the 1990s, considerable progress was made toward this goal.  The State 
Council’s “Decision on Reform of the Financial System”, publicized in December, 1993, 
provided the basis for commercializing China’s state-owned specialized banks, including the 
ABC.  This was soon followed by the promulgation of China’s first Central Bank Law and 
Commercial Bank Law (Park and Sehrt, 2001; Lardy, 1998).
11  In 1994 officials began to 
separate lending responsibilities of different banks, creating policy banks to handle policy-
oriented lending and leaving commercial banks to loan to businesses on the basis of 
                                                 
11 Also, as Lardy (1998) points out, 1993 was a turning point for China’s financial reform because of the 
appointment of Zhu Rongji, then vice premier, to be the president of China’s central bank.  This increased the 
powers of the central bank and strengthened government resolve to commercialize the banking system. 
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commercial merit.  Leaders also removed restrictions that had previously kept different 
banks from lending to specific sectors or types of borrowers.  For example, ABC branches 
were allowed to lend to companies in urban areas even if the firms had no connection with 
agriculture.  Finally, the banks were warned that budgetary transfers would no longer cover 
operational losses.  Profits, to a much greater degree, would stay inside the banking system.  
In sum, the liberalization reforms were designed to create a more market-oriented, profit-
driven banking system.  Banks were granted much greater autonomy to choose their own 
business plans of action, reorganize branch structures, and set the control rights of their own 
branch managers so local outlets would be more responsive to meeting the objectives of the 
parent institution. 
   One benefit of our focus on rural financial institutions is that they are less likely to 
be influenced by government policy concerns than their urban counterparts.  While banks 
such as the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China were obligated to lend to state-owned 
enterprises, rural financial institutions in general were not subject to policy lending 
requirements and instead lent willingly to the rapidly emerging rural industrial sector (Che 
and Qian, 1998).  The main exception was the ABC’s responsibility to finance the 
procurement of agricultural commodities by local grain bureaus, but these loans were 
transferred in 1994 to the newly established Agricultural Development Bank of China.  
RCCs have never had explicit policy lending responsibilities.  Thus, for rural banks, policy 
lending was mainly in the form of political pressure by local government leaders seeking to 
support pet projects considered important to the township’s economic future.   
In our survey, we asked the managers of ABC county branches and RCC county 
associations to weigh the relative importance of bank profitability and government policy in 
lending decisions (Table 2).  In 1990, 41.4 percent of the managers reported that local 
government policies were at least as important as profitability.  By 1997, this percentage had 
dropped dramatically to 3.4 percent.  Meanwhile, the percentage of those managers who 
claimed that bank profitability was solely important jumped from 3.5 percent in 1990 to 55.2 
percent in 1997.  These figures demonstrate that, by 1997, managers were focused 
increasingly on commercial profits as their main objective.  
Given these changes, one might think that decentralization would increase as 
concerns over agency problems diminished.  However, just the opposite occurred.  To 
describe trends in decentralization of loan approval authority, we must first introduce the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 461 
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measurements we employ.  Distinctions in China’s accounting system among the sources of 
funds used for lending create the need for two sets of loan decentralization measures.  
One type of loan in Chinese banks is called zengliang daikuan or “loans using 
incremental funds.”  Loans of this type are funds newly available from deposit growth or 
from transfers from upper level banks, which can be considered new funds borrowed from 
the banking system.  Loans of this type can be extended to either new or existing clients.  
We refer to loans using incremental funds as “Type I” lending.  We define an index variable 
for decentralization of Type I lending authority which is equal to zero if there is complete 
centralization, one if local managers have partial discretion to approve loans, and two if they 
have full discretion.  Partial discretion means that loans can be approved by the local 
manager as long as the loan is smaller than a defined limit. 
The other type of loan is cunliang daikuan or “loans using funds from repaid loans.”  
These funds become available when an outstanding loan is repaid to the bank, and can be 
lent to one of three types of firms: those from which the funds were collected, another 
existing client of the bank, or a new client.  When a local manager has the authority to use 
funds from repaid loans to lend to another existing client or to a new client, we call this 
“Type II” lending authority.  Type II lending authority ignores the ability to relend to the 
repaying client, since this is hard to distinguish from fixed credit lines in which the local 
manager actually does not exercise discretion over the lending decision.
12  Our variable for 
measuring Type II lending authority is a categorical variable equal to zero when the local 
manager cannot lend funds from repaid loans to other clients, and equal to one if he can.  
China’s financial system has created different categories of loans for several reasons.  
First, allowing firms to draw from a pool of funds from repaid loans increases the incentive 
for local branch managers to improve repayment performance.  For this reason, we might 
expect Type II lending authority to be more decentralized.  Second, having a source of funds 
from new incremental sources allows upper level officials to be more selective with funds 
that are viewed as more liquid, and hence more valuable.  In general, fixed capital loans are 
more likely to fall under Type I lending authority and working capital loans are more likely to 
fall under Type II lending authority. 
                                                 
12 For example, because of the holdup problem, the bank has to relend to current borrowers should they repay 
loans that are due. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 461 
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The survey data show clearly that despite the financial reforms described above, 
between 1994 and 1997, officials in rural financial institutions were actively centralizing 
lending authority.  Among the 29 county branch managers we interviewed, about half of 
them stated that the local bank managers’ lending authority had been reduced between 1994 
and 1997 (Table 3).  In contrast, only four of them (or 13.8 percent) believed local branch 
managers had more loan approval authority in 1997 than in 1994.  The information about 
lending authority in 1997 collected from the interviews with local bank managers shows that 
county branch managers completely centralized Type I lending authority in 68.6 percent of 
ABC local branches and RCCs (Table 3).  As expected, Type II lending authority was more 
decentralized than Type I lending authority, with only 44.0 percent of rural financial 
institutions lacking such control rights.     
 
3.3.    Empirical Specification and Variable Definitions 
We test the theoretical predictions summarized in Table 1 by estimating equations 
that specify Type I and Type II lending authority in 1997 as a function of variables that 
represent or proxy for the different model parameters. Although there was an overall move 
towards centralization, the data show that different localities and different banking systems 
made different choices.  In 1997, there was considerable variation in control rights among 
bank types, counties, and even among townships within counties (Table 3).  Our goal is to 
exploit the cross-sectional variation in the data to test the predictions of the refinancing 
model.  
Following the definitions of Type I and Type II lending described above, we define 
the categorical decentralization variables d1 and d2, respectively. The unobserved latent 
propensity to decentralize lending authority, d*, is defined in reduced form as a function of 
the model parameters: 
 
(14)   ) , , , , , , , ( * V R R G c N m d d I L q =  
 
We model (14) as a linear function.  The categorical variables d1 and d2 take on different 
values depending on whether d* is above or below specific threshold levels.  Using this 
assumption, we can estimate (14) as an ordered probit model for Type I lending authority 
and as a probit model for Type II lending authority. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 461 
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  One of the key implications of the refinancing model is that banks can more credibly 
commit to liquidating projects if loan approval authority is centralized.  In addition to 
analyzing the determinants of decentralization as described above, we also test this 
implication by specifying an equation for the determinants of the bank manager’s likelihood 
of seizing collateral in the event that loans are not repaid on time.  Define s* to be the bank 
manager’s true probability of seizing collateral when non-repayment occurs:   
 
(15)  ) , , , , , , , , ( * V R R G c N m d s s I L q =  
 
The main test is whether decentralization, d, has a negative effect on s.  Concerned 
about the endogeneity of d, we include all of the variables in the decentralization 
specification as controls.  Although we refrain from formal modeling, it is not hard to 
theorize how each of these might affect s*.  V and c are particularly likely to be important 
factors.  First, the greater the liquidation value, or the easier it is to seize collateral, the more 
likely the manager should be to seize collateral conditional on non-repayment.  Second, the 
effect of competition on refinancing (or not liquidating projects gone bad) is debatable.  
Petersen and Rajan (1995) argue that bank competition weakens relational lending between 
lenders and borrowers as the future return of relational lending becomes uncertain, making 
lenders less likely to rescue borrowers that are financially distressed.  However Dinc (2000) 
points out that even if the credit market is competitive, reputation effects may make bank 
managers more likely to rescue rather than liquidate financially distressed projects.  The 
other covariates, m, N, G, RL, RI, and ? affect the profitability of lending, which determines 
the opportunity cost of funds, or the opportunity cost of the manager’s time, both of which 
might affect the decision on whether to seize collateral.  Because we lack plausible 
instruments, d may suffer from endogeneity bias.  However, we argue that this bias should 
be upward since central managers should be more likely to decentralize authority to 
managers who have a greater propensity to seize collateral.  This expected bias cannot 
explain a negative coefficient on the decentralization variable as predicted by the refinancing 
model.   
Although s* is unobserved, we do have information on the categorical variable s, 
which equals 1 if the bank manager would definitely not seize collateral, 2 if it is unlikely, 3 if 
it is possible, 4 if seizure is likely, and 5 if the bank manager would definitely seize collateral.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 461 
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We can thus estimate (15) as an ordered probit, with cutoff values for discrete choices 
estimated along with the coefficients for the independent variables.  Our data show that 
about a half of 111 local bank managers who responded to the survey question said they 
would definitely not or were unlikely to seize collateral; more than one fourth (27 percent) 
reported that there was a possibility that they would seize collateral; and less than one fourth 
(22.5 percent) said they would very likely or definitely seize collateral.   
 
Independent Variables 
Table 4 summarizes the mean values for independent variables used in the empirical 
analysis as well as the means for banks whose managers have different levels of lending 
authority.  Here, we briefly explain how each variable is constructed and its appropriateness 
for measuring the parameter of interest. 
To measure information cost (m), we include the average education level and age of 
local bank managers of the same bank type in the same county (EDU and AGE), and an 
indicator of previous loan performance (LNPERF).  We avoid including the local manager’s 
own education level and age because of concern that the assignment of managers to 
different branches within the county is not random.  For example, if educated and 
experienced managers are more likely be sent to problem areas, we might misinterpret the 
effect of manager characteristics on decentralization of lending authority.  Although county 
managers have great discretion in assigning managers to different townships in their county, 
there is no movement of township branch managers across counties.  The county means 
thus reflect the average characteristics of the pool of local managers in the county.
13  Past 
loan performance (LNPERF), defined as the proportion of a local branch’s borrowing firms 
that repaid loans on time in 1996, should reflect the ability of local branch managers to 
evaluate and monitor loans.  We use 1996 rather than 1997 data to reduce potential 
endogeneity.  We recognize that LNPERF might also pick up the effects of unobserved firm 
quality or government influence even though measures of both are included in the 
estimation. 
                                                 
13 There remains possible county-level endogeneity from the replacement of old managers with new managers 
that have no previous experience as managers and different levels of education, but this is unlikely to lead to 
substantial bias given the relatively fixed nature of promotion procedures and the difficulty of relocating large 
number of managers to other jobs before retirement. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 461 
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The number of firms (N) is based on estimates by local bank managers of the total 
number of current and potential borrowing firms (FMNUM).
14 
Bank competition (c) is measured by loan market share of other banks (COMP).  The 
greater the share, the greater the competition.  Local bank managers were asked to estimate 
the market share of lending for both themselves and their competitors.  In townships with 
both ABC branches and RCCs, we measure the market shares of each by taking the average 
of the two estimated market shares. 
To measure government influence on lending (G), we include a variable constructed 
from the survey responses summarized in Table 2 (GOV).  We drop data on banks that 
report “others” in Table 2. 
  The lending interest rate (RL) is defined by the annual percentage yield of a six-
month loan at the end of 1997 (LNRATE).  On average, the actual lending rates of ABC 
county branches were 10 or 20 percent above the base rate set by the PBC while those of 
RCC county associations were 40 or 50 percent above the base rate.  We found that the 
lending interest rates within a county for the same type of financial institution were unified.  
This means that within a county the lending interest rates are not endogenous to unobserved 
township characteristics.  While it is still possible that lending interest rates are endogenous 
at the county level, this is less likely given that county rates should be affected by the rates 
charged by other larger financial institutions, and so should reflect regional market 
conditions rather than unobserved aspects of the circumstances facing any individual bank.   
  We include three variables to measure the cost of funds (RI).  The first is the share of 
long-term deposits over total deposits (COST) which reflects the average cost of funds since 
all deposit rates are fixed by the PBC and the interest rates for long-term deposits (e.g., 
certificates of deposit) are higher than short-term deposits.  Local branches might also have 
access to funds from their county branches which they can borrow at a low internal 
borrowing rate.  Under loan-deposit ratio management, this access likely decreases as the 
loan-deposit ratio increases.  We include the planned loan-deposit ratio of the county 
branches for 1997 (CLDRO) and the actual loan-deposit ratios of local branches at the end 
                                                 
14 In China, the definition of a firm is based on the number of employees.  Any business that hires more than 
seven people must be registered as a firm.  The total number of firms includes township and village enterprises 
as well as private enterprises. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 461 
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of 1996 (LLDRO) to reflect the likelihood of internal borrowing.  We again use the 1996 
value instead of the year-end 1997 value to reduce endogeneity problems. 
Two variables describe firm quality (q0).  The first is the share of potential borrowing 
firms that the local bank manager says he would be willing to finance if the firm applied for a 
loan  (FMTYPE).  It is possible that a local bank manager facing poor loan performance 
might complain about firm quality and thus underestimate it.  To account for this potential 
bias, we run a linear regression for (13) in which we instrument using the share of profitable 
township enterprises based on township government accounting records.
15  The fact that 
sign of FMTYPE remained the same after instrumentation suggests that the measurement 
error is negligible.  A second variable measuring firm performance is industrial output value 
per capita in the township in 1996 (IOPERC).  Since the specification already includes total 
number of firms and quality of firms, this variable captures the average scale of enterprises 
in the township.  Bank managers may prefer larger firms because all things equal, large firms 
can more easily raise cash during periods of difficulty and might receive implicit support 
from local government officials.  An additional identification problem related to firm quality 
is that the theory suggests that if centralization reduces refinancing, managers may exert 
more effort and firm performance should improve.  While we lack plausible instruments to 
deal effectively with this problem, we can sign the bias.  The simultaneity should lead us to 
underestimate the effect of firm quality on decentralization. 
Collateral value (V) is measured by a question asked of bank managers about 
liquidation cost (LIQ) and by the percentage of local firms that are private (PESHARE).  
Liquidation cost is measured on a scale of 1 and 5, where 1 indicates that high liquidation 
cost was a very serious problem and 5 means liquidation cost was not a problem at all.  The 
survey finds that 65.8 percent of local bank manager chose 1 or 2 (very serious and serious, 
respectively).  Only 25.3 percent selected 5 (not a problem).  Here higher ranking represents 
lower liquidation costs or higher liquidation value (LIQ).  We replaced missing values with 
county averages for the same bank type, since we expect local branches in the same county 
to share a common court and other institutions affecting liquidity costs.  Inclusion of 
                                                 
15 Our survey collected some key information about each township enterprises that existed in 1994 and were 
still operating in 1997.  Based on the data, we can calculate the share of profitable township enterprises.  The 
reason we din not use this variable to represent the firm quality is that it excludes private enterprises.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 461 
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PESHARE captures the greater political difficulty that bank managers have seizing publicly 
owned assets (Park and Shen, forthcoming). 
We include bank dummies (0=RCCs and 1=ABC local branches) and provincial 
dummies (PROV) to capture unobserved institutional differences between bank types and 
regions.  Because RCCs have a more extensive branch network, we expect their information 
to be better than that of ABC branch managers.  All estimation results include standard 
errors adjusted for clustering by county.   
 
3.4.  Empirical Results: Decentralization 
Our empirical results confirm many of the predictions of the refinancing model.  For 
many independent variables, this is apparent even in cross-tabular data on Type I and Type 
II lending authority (Table 4).
16  Older, presumably more experienced, managers are more 
likely to have control rights, although educated managers are less likely, perhaps because 
younger managers tend to be more educated.  A bank’s past loan performance has a positive 
relationship with decentralization; bank competition is negatively correlated; lending interest 
rates are positively correlated, firm quality variables are positively correlated, and 
government influence is negatively correlated.     
The main estimation results for the determinants of Type I and Type II lending 
authority are presented in Tables 5 and 6.  For each type of lending authority we report 
estimates for both a “full” sample in which missing values for a number of variables are 
replaced by county means and for a “pure” sample which excludes all observations with any 
missing values.  For each sample, we report specifications with and without GOV in order to 
see how robust the refinancing model predictions are to controlling for the main alternative 
explanation for centralization.  The tables report marginal effects of changes in the 
independent variables on the probability that lending authority is partly or fully 
decentralized.  Tables with coefficient estimates are available from the authors upon request.  
Overall, the results strongly confirm the predictions of the refinancing model.  For 
Type I lending authority, all of the coefficients are of the expected sign and most are 
statistically significant.  The coefficients on education and age, our measures of information 
                                                 
16 The incentive scheme may also have played a role in the course decentralization.  However, the impact of 
incentives may be ambiguous.  Using the share of bonus in annual income of local bank employees to represent 
the incentives, we found that the incentives are negatively associated with decentralization. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 461 
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cost, are both positive in all specifications.  Both are statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level in the full specification (1) and education is also significant in specifications (3) and (4).  
Managers with degrees above high school are about 40 percent more likely to have Type I 
lending authority and an extra year of experience increases the probability of decentralization 
by 2-3 percent.  Past loan performance is positive when GOV is controlled for, but not 
statistically significant.  Firm number has a statistically significant but small effect on the 
likelihood of decentralization, with a 10 percent increase in firms evaluated at the sample 
mean increasing the likelihood of decentralization by only half a percentage point.  Bank 
competition significantly reduces the probability of decentralization in three of four 
specifications; a one percent reduction of lending market share reduces the probability of 
decentralization by 0.45-0.60 percent.  Government influence has a negative effect on 
decentralization as expected.  Although the magnitude of the effect is large, a one rank 
change in a five-rank ordinal scale reducing the likelihood of decentralization by 11-18 
percent, the coefficients are not statistically significant in any specification.   
The empirical results show that all those variables that have opposite predictions in 
the costly information model and refinancing model are consistent with the predictions of 
the refinancing model.  The coefficients on our measures of the lending interest rate, the 
cost of funds, firm quality, and collateral value (or the liquidation cost) that are statistically 
significant all are consistent with the refinancing model.  Even when the coefficients are not 
statistically significant, they have the predicted sign.  The share of long-term deposits is 
statistically significant in specifications (3) and (4), a one percent increase reducing the 
likelihood of decentralization by 0.6-0.9 percent.  The effect of loan-deposit ratios, both at 
the local (township) and central (county) levels are highly statistically significant in all 
specifications.  A one percent increase in local (central) loan-deposit ratio reduces the 
probability of decentralization by 0.4-0.8 (1.6-2.7) percent.  Thus central liquidity has an 
affect roughly three times that of local liquidity.  The quality of the borrowing pool, 
measured by firm quality--the percent of good, or credit-worthy firms in the township 
(FMTYPE), and firm quantity--industrial output per capita (IOPERC), has a positive effect 
on decentralization in all cases.  The coefficient on FMTYPE is significant in all 
specifications and the coefficient on IOPERC is statistically significant in specification (4).  
A one percent increase in FMTYPE increases the probability of decentralization by 0.7-0.9 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 461 
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percent.  Finally, both measures of liquidity value, LIQ and PESHARE, have expected 
negative signs, with LIQ statistically significant in specifications (3) and (4). 
The bank dummy has a consistent negative sign and is statistically significant, 
indicating that RCCs are more decentralized in lending decisions than the ABCs ceteris 
paribus.  We offer two possible reasons to explain the difference.  First, there may be a size 
effect.  As a national financial institution, the ABCs are better integrated into regional and 
national financial markets, providing more lending or other investment opportunities.  
Second, RCCs have a larger branch structure within the township so are likely to have 
advantages in information gathering.   
Next, we turn to the results for Type II lending.  We expect differences with Type I 
lending to reflect the fact that Type II lending authority considers the center’s desire to 
provide an incentive for managers to exert effort to collect outstanding loans rather than 
simply roll over bad loans.
17  Type I lending authority, on the other hand, governs the use of 
incremental funds, which are independent of previously lent funds.  Not surprisingly, the 
results for Type II lending authority generally are not as strong as for Type I lending 
authority.  However, many of the differences can be explained by the additional repayment 
motive guiding Type II lending authority. 
The results for Type II lending authority for the most part are consistent with the 
refinancing model.  The signs are all as expected, with the exception of mixed signs for the 
lending interest rate, for which the signs were wrong for Type I lending, mixed signs for the 
share of long-term deposits, and a positive sign for difficulty in seizing collateral, which is 
statistically significant in specification (3).  Regarding the latter result, the reversal of sign for 
liquidation value (LIQ), we speculate that since Type II lending authority is intended to 
provide a positive incentive for managers to enforce loan repayment, decentralization may 
be complementary to having a credible threat to seize collateral, or an ability to enforce.   
Otherwise, the main differences between the determinants of Type I and Type II 
lending authority are differences in the statistical significance and magnitude of the 
coefficients.  While education is important for Type I lending, it is statistically insignificant 
                                                 
17 Our survey shows that because of insufficient guarantees and high liquidation costs, of the non-performing 
loans that existed by the end of 1996, only about 15 percent of them were recovered during the year of 1997.  
For those loans newly made to TVEs during 1997, on average 56.5 percent of them were just rolled over.  
During the same period, 47.3 percent of new loans granted to private enterprises belonged to the same William Davidson Institute Working Paper 461 
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for Type II lending.  At the same time, the coefficient for age is twice as high and statistically 
significant, suggesting that experience is a more important consideration for Type II lending, 
perhaps reflecting its greater value in getting loans repaid.  The coefficient for loan 
performance is also much greater for Type II lending, and statistically significant in 
specification (3), an the effect of government influence is also greater and now statistically 
significant.  Both suggest that decentralization is less likely if the center perceives there is 
little hope of recovering repayment even if the local manager has control rights over repaid 
funds, because the manager’s previous performance has been poor and/or local leaders are 
influential.  The importance of loan-deposit ratios seems less pronounced for Type II 
lending, perhaps because the higher cost of funds magnifies the value of repaid funds, 
increasing the incentive to enforce repayment associated with Type II lending authority.  
Finally, the coefficient on FMTYPE is much smaller and statistically insignificant, perhaps 
reflecting the fact that repayment incentives have higher priority where there are more bad 
firms.  Thus, most of the differences in the results for Type II lending are consistent with an 
added concern about effort incentives to recover outstanding loans. 
In concluding our discussion of the results for the determinants of decentralization, 
we make two observations.  First, all of the predicted effects coming from the refinancing 
model are confirmed and are statistically significant.  This is true even when the costly 
information model with agency yields ambiguous or opposite predictions.  We are unaware 
of alternative explanations of decentralization that can explain the same pattern of results.  
Second, the variable measuring government influence has a statistically insignificant 
coefficient for Type I lending, and its inclusion does not appreciably alter the other 
coefficients for either Type I or Type II lending.  This suggests agency problems cannot 
explain the patterns of decentralization that we observe, and that omitted variables related to 
agency are unlikely to be biasing our estimates.  One explanation for the dominance of the 
refinancing model is that, after the rapid expansion of the rural industrial sector in the early 
1990s, competition within and outside the sector reduced new entry.  Most recent new loans 
were in fact directed to finance (or refinance) existing firms.  An overall decline in the 
performance of township and village enterprises in the mid-1990s also led to a large increase 
                                                                                                                                                 
category.  Some newly privatized enterprises inherited loans from TVEs.  For that part of loans, the repayment 
rate was not improved a lot even if there were transferred from a collective enterprise to a private one. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 461 
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of firms needing refinancing, and so how such requests were handled became a key concern 
of county branch managers in delegating control rights over lending.  
 
3.5.  Empirical Results:  Collateral Seizure 
Next, we present the results for the ordered probit estimates of the likelihood of 
seizing collateral when loans are not repaid on time (Table 7).  As described earlier, our goal 
is to test whether centralization of lending authority actually increases the credibility of 
threats to liquidate projects and seize collateral.  Our hypothesis is that the coefficient on the 
decentralization variable will have a negative effect on the probability that collateral will be 
seized when repayment is late.  We conducted separate estimations including Type I and 
Type II lending variables separately and in combination, and found significant effects only 
for Type I lending authority, which we report in Table 7.  The lack of effects for Type II 
lending is not surprising since Type II lending authority increases incentives of managers to 
enforce repayment and follow through with threats to seize collateral.  As before, we report 
specifications for both the “full” and “pure” samples.  We also report results for 
specifications with all of the control variables from the decentralization equations and for a 
more parsimonious specification that we deem as essential controls, the liquidation value 
variables (LIQ and PESHARE) and the competition variable (COMP).    
The main result is that the coefficient for Type I lending authority is negative and 
significant in three of the four specifications.  Decentralization reduces the likelihood of 
collateral seizure by 10-15 percent.  The insignificant result for specification (3) suggests that 
identification is weakened when the sample is small and the number of independent 
variables large.
18  In interpreting this result, a main concern is the potential for simultaneity 
bias because county managers could allocate control rights conditional on knowledge of the 
refinancing tendency of local bank managers.  However, the direction of such bias can be 
signed since in general managers should decentralize more when the local manager is less 
likely to refinance.  But this should lead to upward bias in the parameter estimates, leading to 
a more positive relationship between decentralization and collateral seizure.  This only makes 
it harder to arrive at a statistically significant negative coefficient, which is consistent with 
                                                 
18 In a joint estimation of the ordered probits for Type I lending (specification 3) and collateral seizure 
(specification 3) that allowed for jointly normal, correlated errors, the sign on the decentralization variable 
became negative and nearly statistically significant.  Other joint specifications failed to converge.  This result 
confirms that bias if anything is against finding a negative relationship. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 461 
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our refinancing model.  Although we cannot rule out remaining bias from omitted variables, 
we find it difficult to think of ones which could produce the strong relationships we see in 
the data.  Unfortunately, we lack plausible instruments to more convincingly identify the 
effect of control rights on the ability to credibly refuse refinancing. 
Most of the signs for other variables are consistent with expectations, and here we 
discuss just a few results of interest.  Liquidation value has a positive sign across 
specifications and is statistically significant in specifications (1) and (3).  The strong negative 
sign for bank competition lends support to Dinc (2000) who emphasizes the beneficial 
aspects of competition for reputational lending.  Most of the variables related to the cost of 
refinancing have the expected signs and are statistically significant.  One exception is that the 
signs on the firm quality variables are negative and significant in some cases.  Perhaps the 
expected return of rescuing a distressed firm is higher in an economy in which there are 
more good firms.     
 
5.  Conclusions 
   China’s financial reforms have aimed to promote greater independence and market 
orientation of financial intermediaries through increased bank competition, reduction of 
policy loans, and stronger profit incentives.   Decentralization of managerial authority in 
such settings should help improve the efficiency of resource allocation by giving local 
managers greater incentives to screen loans effectively and enforce repayment.  This is 
especially true when institutions capable of providing independently verifiable information 
on credit-worthiness and collateral values are lacking, which increases information 
asymmetry between the center and local levels and makes local information more valuable. 
In China, however, banks responded to reform by centralizing rather than 
decentralizing lending authority.  In this paper, we provide a new explanation and a new 
model for the benefits of centralization in China, as well as in other developing and 
transition economies.  When banks have difficulty credibly committing to not refinance 
projects when firms are in distress, centralization can help by reducing available information.  
Using unique data from surveys conducted by the authors of rural financial institutions in 
China, we provide empirical support for the refinancing model.  The more frequently 
conjectured reason for centralization, moral hazard problems, is not well supported by the 
data or by the trends of decreasing policy influence and increasing centralization over time.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 461 
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Nor can it explain why such problems cannot be solved by directly addressing the incentive 
problem, which avoids the costly loss of local information.   
The lack of mature institutions to support the negotiation and enforcement of 
lending contracts creates a paradox.  On the one hand, it increases the value of local 
information embodied in the local manager’s knowledge and experience because 
independent verifiable information sources are lacking.  This increases the value of 
decentralization.  On the other hand, it also exacerbates the refinancing problem when 
lending authority is delegated by making liquidation of projects difficult.  When the 
refinancing problem becomes sufficiently important, it precludes decentralization in exactly 
those institutional contexts for which the loss of local information is most costly.  This may 
be especially hard on the nascent private sector, for which local information may be 
particularly important for quality assessments.  The poor information of central bank 
managers can help explain the frequent complaints in China that banks have stopped lending 
as well as the complaints of bankers that good projects are impossible to find.  In more 
developed market systems, decentralization may not be a critical concern because so much 
of a firm’s information is verifiable through audited financial statements, credit histories, etc.  
We conclude that financial liberalization is not a panacea.  Effective financial intermediation 
requires the creation of effective supporting institutions, a process which is slow and gradual. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 461 
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Table 1 
Theoretical Predictions on the Determinants of Financial Decentralization 
 
  Costly Information 
Model and Extensions 
 Refinancing  
Model 
Overall 
Predictions 
Information cost (m)  -    - 
Number of firms (N)  +    + 
Banking competition (c )  -    - 
Government influence (G)  -    - 
Lending interest rate (RL)  -  ?  ? 
Cost of funds (RI)  +  -  ? 
Firm quality (q0)  ?  +  ? 
Collateral or liquidation value 
(V) 
?  -  ? 
Note:  All results assume that information costs are fixed.  If information costs are variable, the number of 
firms (N) and banking competition (c) have no effect on decentralization and for the costly information model 
the effect of better firm quality (q0) is negative rather than uncertain.   
 
 
Table 2 
Relative Importance of Profits and Government Policy in Lending 
 
  1990  1997 
Bank profitability was solely important  3.5  55.2 
Bank profitability was more important than government policy  51.7  35.5 
Bank profitability and government policy were equally important   13.8  3.4 
Government policy was more important than bank profitability  20.7  0 
Government policy was solely important  6.9  0 
Others  3.4  6.9 
Note: This table reports subjective assessments by managers of ABC county branches and RCC county 
associations.  Local government leaders were asked the same questions and similar results were obtained. 
 
 
Table 3 
Decentralization of Lending Authority to Local Bank Managers 
 
  Type I   Type II a 
Changes in Lending Authority between 1994 and 1997 b     
Shrunk  51.7  - 
No change  34.5  - 
Expanded  13.8  - 
Observations  29   
Lending Authority in 1997 c     
Full centralization (no lending authority)  66.1  44.0 
Partial decentralization (defined limit on lending authority)  29.6  56.0 
Full decentralization (no limits on lending authority)  4.3   
Observations  115  109 
a Data does not allow us to distinguish between partial and full decentralization. 
b Data collected from interviews with managers of ABC county branches and RCC County Associations. 
c Data collected from interviews with managers of ABC local branches and RCCs. 
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Table 4 
Summary of Independent Variables 
 
Parameter  Definition (variable name)  Full 
sample 
Type I lending authority 
(CONTROL1) 
Type II lending authority 
(CONTROL2) 
      0  1  2  0  1 
m  Local bank manager’s education background a (EDU)  0.62  0.64  0.57  0.52  0.72  0.54 
m  The age of local bank managers (AGE)  39.22  38.86  39.94  40.04  37.90  39.94 
m, ?  Share of borrowing firms repaid loans timely in 1996 (LNPERF)  0.67  0.66  0.69  0.76  0.59  0.74 
N  Total number of firms in the community in 1997 (FMNUM)  158.40  144.03  205.21  70.00  129.91  180.86 
c  Share of loans made by other lenders in 1997 (COMP)  0.61  0.64  0.57  0.27  0.62  0.59 
G  The role of government policy in lending b (GOV)  1.54  1.61  1.44  1.00  1.56  1.48 
RL  Lending interest rate by the end of 1997 (LNRATE)  0.095  0.093  0.098  0.100  0.093  0.095 
RI  Share of long-term deposits over total deposits in 1997 (COST)  0.688  0.699  0.660  0.734  0.681  0.700 
RI  Loan-deposit ratio in local bank branches by the end of 1996 (LDRO)   0.679  0.684  0.682  0.596  0.671  0.683 
RI  Loan-deposit ratio in county bank branches (CLDRO)  0.697  0.700  0.688  0.694  0.732  0.668 
?  Qualified borrowing firms over all firms in townships (FMTYPE)  0.42  0.37  0.47  0.77  0.39  0.44 
?  Industrial output value per capita in 1996 (1,000 yuan per capita) (IOPERC)  21.33  2.13  2.35  1.62  19.53  23.98 
V  Liquidation value c (LIQ)  2.50  2.60  2.41  2.28  2.53  2.47 
V  Share of output value from private enterprises in 1996 (PESHARE)  0.26  0.22  0.33  0.175  0.32  0.17 
  Total observations  115  77  35  5  48  61 
a 1=with degrees above high school; 0=otherwise. 
b 1= Bank profitability was solely important; 2= Bank profitability was more important than government policy; 3= Bank profitability and government policy were 
equally important; 4= Government policy was more important than bank profitability; 5= Government policy was solely important. 
c 1=liquidation cost is extremely high; 2=very high; 3=high; 4=modestly high; 5=normal. 
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Table 5 
Marginal Effects of Determinants of Type I Lending Authority 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Marginal 
Effects 
Standard 
Errors 
Marginal 
Effects 
Standard 
Errors 
Marginal 
Effects 
Standard 
Errors 
Marginal 
Effects 
Standard 
Errors 
EDU  0.386*  0.233  0.351  0.257  0.460**  0.224  0.412*  0.237 
AGE  0.030*  0.018  0.030  0.019  0.022  0.020  0.019  0.020 
LNPERF  0.021  0.182  -0.025  0.176  0.017  0.208  -0.122  0.183 
FMNUM  0.0003*  0.000  0.0003  0.000  0.0003*  0.000  0.0003*  0.000 
COMP  -0.446*  0.262  -0.529**  0.245  -0.500  0.392  -0.603*  0.337 
GOV  -0.114  0.094      -0.182  0.131     
LNRATE  -11.867  14.692  -17.453  16.882  10.896  15.493  8.526  15.711 
COST  -0.263  0.343  -0.005  0.259  -0.939**  0.444  -0.623***  0.220 
LLDRO  -0.416*  0.227  -0.369*  0.216  -0.810**  0.377  -0.720**  0.348 
CLDRO  -1.625***  0.627  -1.881***  0.696  -2.190***  0.788  -2.707***  0.856 
FMTYPE  0.660**  0.271  0.701**  0.284  0.849***  0.288  0.871***  0.305 
IOPERC  0.005  0.031  0.017  0.026  0.035  0.031  0.055*  0.030 
LIQ  -0.089  0.056  -0.086  0.056  -0.104**  0.049  -0.107**  0.050 
PESHARE  -0.067  0.344  -0.028  0.361  -0.403  0.420  -0.321  0.424 
BANK (0=RCCs; 1=ABC)  -0.497***  0.149  -0.533***  0.155  -0.399**  0.204  -0.393**  0.193 
PROV (0=Zhejiang; 1=Jiangsu)  -0.315*  0.177  -0.370**  0.180  -0.300  0.258  -0.370  0.271 
Observations  84    84    64    64   
Notes: The dependent variable is decentralization of Type I lending authority, defined as follows: 1=full centralization, 2=partial decentralization, 3=full 
decentralization.  Marginal effects are the effects on the likelihood of decentralization (partial or full) rather than full centralization, based on ordered probit estimates 
evaluated at sample means.  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels.  Specifications (1) and (2) 
use county means to replace missing values for independent variables. 
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Table 6 
Marginal Effects of Determinants of Type II Lending Authority 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Marginal 
Effects 
Standard 
Errors 
Marginal 
Effects 
Standard 
Errors 
Marginal 
Effects 
Standard 
Errors 
Marginal 
Effects 
Standard 
Errors 
EDU  0.384  0.281  0.298  0.292  0.130  0.229  0.003  0.291 
AGE  0.090***  0.029  0.070**  0.031  0.060**  0.030  0.051**  0.029 
LNPERF  0.295  0.291  0.219  0.299  0.559**  0.216  0.264  0.237 
FMNUM  0.0002  0.000  0.00004  0.000  0.001*  0.000  0.001  0.000 
COMP  0.243  0.414  -0.092  0.363  -0.434  0.401  -0.620  0.426 
GOV  -0.354***  0.118      -0.271***  0.099     
LNRATE  -2.720  22.397  -27.310  21.561  22.486  12.855  10.910  18.173 
COST  0.600  0.514  0.619  0.522  -0.598  0.468  -1.040***  0.488 
LLDRO  -0.157  0.165  -0.257  0.163  -0.868***  0.196  -1.053***  0.248 
CLDRO  -1.158***  0.259  -1.147**  0.489  -1.061**  0.311  -1.255*  0.534 
FMTYPE  0.108  0.241  0.242  0.237  0.092  0.220  0.348  0.248 
IOPERC  0.039  0.046  0.047  0.046  0.096*  0.040  0.135**  0.051 
LIQ  0.051  0.069  0.027  0.069  0.100*  0.073  0.089  0.064 
PESHARE  -0.032  0.319  0.020  0.323  -0.321  0.266  -0.205  0.297 
BANK (0=RCCs; 1=ABC)  -0.388  0.363  -0.580*  0.278  0.203  0.222  0.204  0.279 
PROV (0=Zhejiang; 1=Jiangsu)  0.295  0.192  0.140  0.181  0.583***  0.187  0.499**  0.202 
Observations  80    80    61    61   
Notes: The dependent variable is decentralization of Type II lending authority, defined as follows: 0=full centralization, 1=partial or full decentralization.  Marginal 
effects based on ordered probit estimates evaluated at sample means.  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.  *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
confidence levels.  Specifications (1) and (2) use county means to replace missing values for independent variables. 
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Table 7 
Marginal Effects of Determinants of Propensity to Seize Collateral Once a Loan Is Overdue 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Marginal 
Effects 
Standard 
Errors 
Marginal 
Effects 
Standard 
Errors 
Marginal 
Effects 
Standard 
Errors 
Marginal 
Effects 
Standard 
Errors 
CONTROL1  -0.114**  0.054  -0.146***  0.048  0.024  0.077  -0.106**  0.054 
EDU  0.045  0.115      -0.103  0.102     
AGE  0.013  0.012      0.006  0.009     
LNPERF  0.039  0.126      -0.206  0.203     
FMNUM  0.001  0.000      0.001*  0.000     
COMP  -0.577*  0.307  -0.575**  0.269  -0.678*  0.355  -0.592**  0.290 
GOV  0.034  0.055      0.089  0.076     
LNRATE  -36.883***  13.072      -31.253***  11.578     
COST  0.063  0.187      0.502  0.326     
LLDRO  -0.135***  0.042      -0.039  0.102     
CLDRO  0.790***  0.210      0.859***  0.316     
FMTYPE  -0.127  0.104      -0.139  0.114     
IOPERC  -0.029***  0.009      -0.032***  0.011     
LIQ  0.096**  0.040  0.034  0.025  0.110**  0.047  0.018  0.030 
PESHARE  0.362*  0.208  0.233  0.173  0.696*  0.364  0.485  0.312 
BANK (0=RCCs; 1=ABC)  -0.508***  0.143  0.002  0.064  -0.359**  0.161  0.033  0.057 
PROV (0=Zhejiang; 1=Jiangsu)  0.105  0.085  0.123  0.103  0.291*  0.151  0.236*  0.145 
Observations  81    81    62    62   
Notes: The dependent variable is the likelihood of seizing collateral if a loan is overdue, defined as follows: 1=definitely not, 2=unlikely, 3=possible, 4=likely, 5=yes, 
for sure.  Marginal effects are for the probability of choice 5, seizing collateral for sure, based on ordered probit estimates evaluated at sample means.  Numbers in 
parentheses are standard errors.  *, **, and *** represent the 10%, 5%, and 1% confidence levels.  Specifications (1) and (2) use county means to replace missing values 
for independent variables. 
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